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By Princess Eugene Majuru

Every state requires a security system—armed forces, police, and intelligence services—to protect sovereignty, maintain order, and ensure stability. Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution recognises this necessity and sets out principles to guide the conduct of these institutions. However, while the Constitution speaks clearly about professionalism and non-partisanship, it is less forceful when it comes to enforcement and accountability mechanisms.

The result is a constitutional framework where the ideals of a neutral and accountable security sector are clearly stated, but the systems to guarantee those ideals remain less defined.

1. The Constitutional Principle of Non-Partisanship

The starting point is Section 208(2), which provides:

“Neither the security services nor any of their members may, in the exercise of their functions—

(a) act in a partisan manner;

(b) further the interests of any political party or cause…”

This is a strong and direct provision.

What it means:

Security institutions must remain politically neutral

They must serve the State, not political actors

Their legitimacy depends on impartial conduct

On paper, this is a clear safeguard against politicisation.

2. The Role of the President in Security Governance

At the same time, the Constitution centralises significant authority over the security sector in the Presidency.

Section 213(1) provides:

“The President as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces has power—

(a) to determine the operational use of the Defence Forces…”

Combined with Section 88(1):

“The President is… Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces.”

Implication:

Strategic and operational control is centralised

Security authority is located in the executive

This concentration of power is not unusual in constitutional systems—but it requires strong oversight to remain balanced.

3. The Missing Link: Enforcement of Neutrality

While Section 208 clearly prohibits partisan behaviour, the Constitution does not provide equally strong mechanisms to enforce this prohibition.

Key questions arise:

What happens if security services act in a partisan manner?

Which institution has the power to investigate and sanction?

How quickly can accountability be enforced?

The Constitution does not provide detailed answers to these questions.

4. Oversight Structures: Limited and Indirect

Parliament has general oversight responsibility under Section 119(2):

“Parliament must ensure that the provisions of this Constitution are upheld…”

However:

oversight is broad, not security-specific

enforcement depends on political processes

there are no direct, automatic sanctions for violations

This creates a gap between:

constitutional expectation and institutional enforcement

5. The Security Services and Constitutional Values

Section 208(1) also provides:

“The security services must act in accordance with this Constitution and the law.”

This reinforces:

legal compliance

constitutional discipline

professional conduct

But again, the provision focuses on principle, not mechanism.

6. The Structural Tension: Power vs Accountability

Zimbabwe’s Constitution creates two simultaneous realities:

(1) Strong principles:

non-partisanship (Section 208)

constitutional obedience (Section 208(1))

national service ethos

(2) Centralised control:

presidential command (Sections 88, 213)

executive influence over security institutions

The gap:

strong rules exist, but enforcement pathways are not equally strong or clearly defined

7. Why This Matters Constitutionally

Security institutions are not ordinary state bodies. They:

carry coercive power

operate with force and authority

directly affect civil liberties and political space

Because of this, constitutional design must ensure not only control, but accountability.

Where accountability is weak or indirect:

public trust may decline

neutrality may be questioned

constitutional principles may be difficult to enforce

8. The Deeper Constitutional Question

The Constitution raises an important governance issue:

Can neutrality in the security sector be guaranteed by principle alone, without strong, independent enforcement mechanisms?

This is the central tension in Zimbabwe’s constitutional design.

A Framework of Principles Awaiting Stronger Enforcement

Zimbabwe’s Constitution is clear in its expectations of the security sector. Sections 208, 88, and 213 establish a framework where:

security institutions must be professional and non-partisan

authority is centralised for operational efficiency

constitutional values guide conduct

However, the enforcement architecture remains less defined.

The result is a system where:

neutrality is declared

accountability is expected

but enforcement is not always structurally guaranteed

In this sense, the Constitution provides a normative model of security governance, but leaves significant room for interpretation in how that model is upheld in practice.

The challenge moving forward is not to rewrite the principles, but to strengthen the systems that ensure those principles are consistently realised.

Until then, Zimbabwe’s constitutional order reflects a critical imbalance:

power is clearly organised, but accountability is less firmly anchored.

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