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By Princess Eugene Majuru

One of the most structurally ambitious promises in Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution is devolution. It is intended to shift governance away from a heavily centralised state toward provincial and local authorities. Yet in practice, this promise remains only partially realised. The Constitution clearly provides for devolution, but the governing architecture continues to concentrate power at the national level.

The legal foundation for devolution is found in Section 264(1), which provides:

“Whenever appropriate, governmental powers and responsibilities must be devolved to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities which are competent to carry out those responsibilities efficiently and effectively.”

This wording is critical. The use of “must” signals obligation, not suggestion. However, the phrase “whenever appropriate” introduces discretion, and this discretion has become one of the key reasons devolution remains uneven in implementation.

1. The Constitutional Purpose of Devolution

Section 264(2) explains why devolution exists:

“The objectives of devolution of governmental powers and responsibilities are to—

(a) give powers of local governance to the people and enhance their participation in the exercise of the powers of the State…”

This establishes a democratic intention:

power closer to communities

increased public participation

reduction of over-centralised decision-making

In theory, this is a structural transformation of governance.

2. Fiscal Control: The Real Centre of Power

Even where administrative powers are devolved in principle, financial control remains central.

Section 301(3) provides:

“Not less than five per cent of the national revenues raised in any financial year must be allocated to provincial and local authorities.”

On paper:

Local governments are guaranteed funding

Revenue sharing is constitutionally required

In practice:

Allocation depends on national budget decisions

Disbursement timing and consistency vary

Local authorities remain financially dependent

This creates a structural imbalance:

administrative devolution without full fiscal autonomy

3. Central Authority Remains Dominant

Despite Section 264’s intention, many key functions remain centralised:

national infrastructure planning

major economic policy decisions

strategic resource allocation

oversight of provincial implementation

This reflects a continuity of the unitary state model in Section 3(1):

“Zimbabwe is a unitary, democratic and sovereign republic.”

While unitary does not mean undemocratic, it does reinforce centralised sovereignty.

4. The Practical Effect: Devolution as Conditional, Not Automatic

The phrase in Section 264(1)—

“Whenever appropriate”

has become the constitutional pivot point.

Its consequence:

devolution is not automatic

implementation depends on interpretation of “appropriateness”

central government retains discretion over timing and scope

This transforms what appears to be a mandatory reform into a conditional policy framework.

5. The Deeper Structural Issue

The tension is not simply legal—it is institutional.

Devolution requires:

administrative restructuring

fiscal redistribution

political decentralisation

But existing governance systems are built on:

centralised planning

national budget control

hierarchical administrative authority

This creates institutional inertia:

the Constitution calls for decentralisation, but the system operates through centralised logic

6. What the Constitution Actually Achieves

It is important to recognise that Section 264 does not fail completely. It does create:

legal recognition of provincial and local authority

constitutional legitimacy for decentralisation

a framework for future reform

However, it does not fully lock in:

enforceable timelines

rigid fiscal guarantees

automatic transfer of powers

Conclusion: A Promise Still Suspended Between Law and Practice

Section 264 represents one of the clearest examples of Zimbabwe’s constitutional duality: strong intention, flexible implementation.

It states clearly that:

“Governmental powers and responsibilities must be devolved…”

Yet it also embeds conditions that allow delay and discretion.

The result is a constitutional structure where devolution exists as:

a legal principle

a policy direction

but not yet a fully operational system of governance

In essence, Zimbabwe’s Constitution does not reject decentralisation—it postpones its full arrival through conditional language and institutional continuity.

Devolution therefore remains one of the Constitution’s most powerful ideas that is still waiting to become a fully lived reality.

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