By Princess Eugene Majuru
One of the most ambitious promises in Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution is devolution. It represents a clear attempt to move away from an overly centralised state and distribute power, responsibility, and resources more evenly across provinces and local authorities. Yet more than a decade later, devolution remains one of the most under-realised constitutional provisions.
At the heart of this framework is Section 264(1), which provides:
“Whenever appropriate, governmental powers and responsibilities must be devolved to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities which are competent to carry out those responsibilities efficiently and effectively.”
This is a strong constitutional statement. The word “must” is important—it signals obligation, not discretion. The Constitution is not merely suggesting devolution; it is requiring it where appropriate.
1. The Constitutional Vision: Power Closer to the People
Section 264(2) further clarifies the purpose of devolution:
“The objectives of devolution of governmental powers and responsibilities are to—
(a) give powers of local governance to the people and enhance their participation in the exercise of the powers of the State…”
What this means on paper:
- Governance should be decentralised
- Communities should participate directly in decision-making
- Local authorities should have meaningful authority
In theory, this is a major shift away from colonial and post-colonial centralisation, where decision-making authority is concentrated in national institutions.
2. Fiscal Devolution: The Missing Engine
Section 301(3) provides a critical financial foundation:
“Not less than five per cent of the national revenues raised in any financial year must be allocated to provincial and local authorities.”
Why this is important:
Devolution is not only political—it is financial. Without resources, local governance becomes symbolic rather than functional.
The practical tension:
- Allocation mechanisms have historically been inconsistent
- Local authorities often remain dependent on central transfers
- Implementation of the 5% threshold has been uneven
This creates a gap between constitutional fiscal design and actual budget practice.
3. Administrative Reality: Centralisation Persists
Despite constitutional language favouring decentralisation, governance in practice remains highly centralised.
Key areas still dominated by central authority include:
- Major infrastructure planning
- Resource allocation decisions
- Key sectoral policy direction
- Administrative oversight of local authorities
This creates a structural contradiction:
The Constitution mandates decentralisation, but the administrative system continues to operate in a centralised logic.
4. Why Devolution Matters Constitutionally
Devolution is not just administrative reform—it is tied to deeper constitutional principles.
Section 3(2)(l) identifies one of the founding values of Zimbabwe as:
“good governance”
And Section 13(2) adds:
“The State must adopt reasonable policies and measures… to promote balanced development of all areas of Zimbabwe.”
What this implies:
- Development should not be geographically unequal
- Governance should respond to local needs
- Power should be closer to affected communities
Devolution is therefore not optional policy—it is linked to constitutional values of fairness and development.
5. The Core Problem: Constitutional Promise vs Institutional Behaviour
The gap between Section 264 and reality is not primarily legal—it is structural.
Three main factors explain this:
(1) Administrative inertia
Existing institutions were built under a centralised model and continue to operate that way.
(2) Fiscal control
Budgetary power remains concentrated at national level, limiting local autonomy.
(3) Political centralisation
Decision-making authority often remains politically centralised despite constitutional language.
6. The Deeper Question: What Kind of State Is Zimbabwe Becoming?
Devolution raises a broader constitutional identity question:
Is Zimbabwe:
- A decentralised republic in practice?
- Or a centralised state with decentralised language?
The Constitution clearly leans toward the first. However, institutional reality often reflects the second.
Conclusion: A Promise Still in Motion
Section 264 remains one of the clearest examples of a constitutional promise awaiting full realisation.
It is not absent from law—it is present, explicit, and mandatory:
“Governmental powers and responsibilities must be devolved…”
The issue is not constitutional silence, but implementation distance.
In this sense, devolution in Zimbabwe is not a failed idea. It is an unfinished constitutional project—one that continues to exist between legal intention and administrative practice.
Until that gap is closed, Section 264 will remain one of the Constitution’s most powerful ideas that has not yet fully become reality.
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