By Princess Eugene Majuru
Every constitution carries a deeper message beyond law. It quietly reveals how a state understands human beings: whether they are seen primarily as individuals, citizens, cultural beings, or economic actors. Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution is particularly interesting because it does not give a single definition of the human person—it constructs a layered identity that combines rights, citizenship, dignity, and development. This creates a hybrid philosophy of what it means to be human within the state.
- The Human Being as a Bearer of Inherent Dignity
The most foundational philosophical statement appears in Section 51, which provides:
“Every person has inherent dignity in their private and public life, and the right to have that dignity respected and protected.”
This is significant because it establishes dignity as inherent, not granted by the state.
What this means:
Human worth exists before law
The state does not create dignity; it must protect it
The individual is not a subject of the state, but a rights-bearing person
This reflects a human-rights philosophy where the individual is central.
- The Human Being as an Equal Legal Subject
Section 56(1) reinforces this legal identity:
“All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.”
What this establishes:
Legal equality is a constitutional baseline
No person is inherently superior in law
The law is meant to treat individuals uniformly
This frames the human being as a legal subject, defined through rights and equality.
- The Human Being as a Citizen of the State
The Constitution also defines identity through citizenship.
Section 35(1) states:
“All persons are Zimbabwean citizens by birth, descent or registration.”
And Section 36 adds continuity:
“Every person who was a citizen of Zimbabwe when this Constitution came into force continues to be a Zimbabwean citizen.”
What this means:
Human identity is legally tied to the nation-state
Belonging is formalised through citizenship categories
The state becomes the primary structure of identity recognition
Here, the human being is not just universal—they are nationalised.
- The Human Being as a Socio-Economic Subject
The Constitution also defines humans through material conditions.
Section 75(1) provides:
“Every citizen and permanent resident of Zimbabwe has a right to a basic State-funded education…”
Section 76(1) adds:
“Every citizen and permanent resident… has the right to have access to basic health-care services…”
And Section 77 states:
“Every person has the right to safe, clean and potable water…”
What this shows:
Humans are defined through access to resources
Rights extend into material wellbeing
The state is responsible for enabling life conditions
This creates a vision of the human being as a social and economic subject, not only a legal one.
- The Human Being as a Cultural and Historical Being
The Constitution also recognises identity beyond law and economics.
Section 16(1) provides:
“The State must promote and preserve cultural values and practices which enhance the dignity, well-being and identity of Zimbabweans.”
And Section 63(1) states:
“Every person has the right to participate in the cultural life of their choice.”
What this means:
Human identity includes culture and tradition
Individuals are shaped by cultural belonging
The state acknowledges plural identities
Here, the human being is also a cultural subject, not just a legal one.
- The Human Being as a Developmental Subject
Finally, the Constitution places humans within a development framework.
Section 13(1) provides:
“The State and all institutions and agencies of government at every level must endeavour to facilitate rapid and equitable development…”
What this implies:
Humans are part of a national development project
The state sees people as beneficiaries of progress
Governance is oriented toward economic transformation
This frames the human being as part of a developmental nation-building process.
The Core Philosophical Tension
When these sections are read together, a complex picture emerges. The Constitution does not define the human being in a single way—it layers multiple identities:
A rights-bearing individual (Section 51, 56)
A citizen of a sovereign state (Section 35–36)
A socio-economic subject (Sections 75–77)
A cultural being (Section 16, 63)
A development participant (Section 13)
The result:
The Zimbabwean Constitution does not offer one philosophy of the human being—it offers several competing ones held together in one legal framework.
Conclusion: A Multi-Layered Constitutional Human
The deeper philosophy of Zimbabwe’s Constitution is not purely liberal, purely communal, or purely developmental. It is composite.
It attempts to balance:
Individual rights
State citizenship
Material wellbeing
Cultural identity
Economic development
This makes it a transitional constitutional philosophy, reflecting a society that is still negotiating how it understands the human person.
The unresolved question is not whether the Constitution recognises humans—it clearly does—but rather:
Which identity of the human being becomes dominant in practice when rights, culture, citizenship, and development come into conflict?
That tension is where constitutional philosophy becomes lived reality.
Comments
About Author
