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By Princess Eugene Majuru

 

At the heart of any legal system lies an often-unspoken question: what counts as truth? Zimbabwe’s Constitution, like many modern constitutions, establishes institutions and procedures for determining truth in matters of law, governance, and public life. Yet the methods through which truth is defined and validated are not neutral—they are rooted in particular intellectual traditions that shape how knowledge itself is recognised.

The Constitution assigns interpretive authority primarily to formal institutions. Section 162(1) provides:

“The judicial authority of Zimbabwe derives from the people of Zimbabwe and is vested in the courts…”

This provision places courts at the centre of truth determination in legal disputes. It is within these institutions that facts are established, evidence is weighed, and legal meaning is produced.

 

The process by which courts interpret rights is further guided by Section 46(1), which states:

“When interpreting this Chapter, a court, tribunal, forum or body—

(a) must give full effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter;

(b) must promote the values and principles that underlie a democratic society…

(e) must take into account international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party…”

This framework directs courts toward a particular mode of reasoning—one grounded in written law, international standards, and formal legal interpretation. Truth, in this context, is something that emerges through structured argument, documentary evidence, and alignment with established legal norms.

 

The Constitution also reinforces the role of formal knowledge in governance more broadly. Section 194(1)(h), which outlines principles of public administration, provides:

“Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information.”

Here, knowledge is framed in terms of “information”—something that can be recorded, verified, and disseminated through institutional channels. This reflects a modern bureaucratic understanding of knowledge as data: measurable, documentable, and administratively controlled.

However, this framework sits alongside a different, often unrecognised, tradition of knowledge in Zimbabwean society. Indigenous systems have historically understood truth as something relational and lived. Knowledge is transmitted through oral tradition, communal memory, and the authority of elders and spirit mediums. It is validated not only through evidence, but through consensus, experience, and continuity with ancestral understanding.

The Constitution does acknowledge customary law. Section 332 defines it as:

“the custom, practice and usage of the people of Zimbabwe… recognised as law.”

Yet, as with other areas, its recognition is mediated through formal institutions. Customary knowledge must often be translated into forms acceptable to courts—documented, standardised, and subject to legal reasoning processes that prioritise written evidence over oral authority.

This creates an epistemological hierarchy. Written, institutional knowledge becomes the dominant form of truth in governance, while oral, communal, and experiential knowledge is secondary unless validated through formal systems.

The implications of this are far-reaching. In legal disputes, oral histories may be questioned unless corroborated by documentation. In policy-making, statistical data may carry more weight than lived community experience. In governance, expertise is often defined by formal education and institutional affiliation, rather than by traditional authority or experiential wisdom.

Decolonisation, in this context, requires a re-examination of how knowledge is recognised within constitutional structures. It asks whether truth must always be filtered through formal institutions, or whether multiple epistemologies can coexist with equal legitimacy.

This does not mean abandoning standards of evidence or accountability. Rather, it means expanding the understanding of what constitutes valid knowledge. It invites a legal imagination in which oral testimony, communal memory, and indigenous epistemologies are not merely supplementary, but foundational in certain contexts.

It also raises practical questions: Can courts develop procedures that give greater weight to oral and community-based knowledge? Can governance systems incorporate traditional forms of consultation and validation alongside formal expertise? Can the Constitution evolve to recognise that knowledge itself is plural?

 

Until these questions are addressed, Zimbabwe’s constitutional order will continue to operate within a framework where truth is largely defined by institutional processes and written authority. It is a system that ensures consistency and accountability—but one that may not fully reflect the diverse ways in which knowledge is produced and understood within society.

In the broader journey of decolonisation, recognising the plurality of knowledge systems is essential. For governance to be truly representative, it must not only speak in the language of law, but also listen to the many voices through which truth is lived, remembered, and transmitted across generations.

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